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COMMENTS
Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law
of Standing
Traditionally, the doctrine of standing has existed as the major
obstacle frustrating the attempts of numerous plaintiffs to obtain
relief for the injuries they have suffered as a result of allegedly
illegal action by federal administrative agencies.1 Frequently, the
rigid standards effectively have prevented any feasible plaintiff from
challenging the actions of an administrative agency. The ultimate
consequence of this problem has been practically to insulate a wide
range of administrative activity from judicial review.2
In recent years the courts have been under increasing pressure
to liberalize the law of standing and to provide a judicial forum
where administrative agencies would be required to justify their
conduct. In response to this pressure, the Supreme Court, in a series
of cases over the past few years, has undertaken a major overhaul of
all aspects of the law of standing. In light of this judicial activity, a
re-examination of the current law of standing appears to be in order.
I.

THE LAW OF STANDING PRIOR TO

1970

The test for standing is focused on the constitutional requirement that the judicial power of the United States be limited to
"cases" and "controversies." 3 In a few situations the Supreme Court
1. The scope of this Comment will be limited to judicial review of federal agencies.
Moreover, it will not discuss, except peripherally, the right of parties to intervene in
federal agency hearings. For a treatment of the right to intervene in agency hearing11,
see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.08 (1958).
2. One area in which judicial review has been restricted on standing grounds
involves actions to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's rulings allowing
national banks to expand their activities into nonbanking operations. See note 16
infra. Also subjected to the same obstacle have been actions by residents of urbanrenewal areas to require federal administrators to comply with statutory standards for
federal housing programs. See Comment, Judicial Review in Urban Renewal Cases:
Concepts and Consequences, 57 GEO. L.J. 615 (1969); Note, Protecting the Standing
of Renewal Site Families To Seek Review of Community Relocation Planning, 73
YALE L.J. 1080 (1964). Other areas in which standing has inhibited judicial review include conservation of historic landmarks (e.g., South Hill Neighborhood Assn. v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); Kent County Coundl
for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969)) and the allocation of electrical-power and utilities markets (Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Rural Elec. Admin. v.
Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955)).
3. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. One of the justifications for the existence of standing is
that it prevents suits that are collusive or friendly or that seek advisory opinions
and that it therefore avoids the resolution of issues that are not fully and openly
argued.
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has stated that this constitutional minimum represents all that is
required to determine standing-that is, when a party shows such a
personal stake in the controversy to assure a "concrete adverseness"
in which issues will be litigated, then standing will attach.4' This
minimum approach, however, generally has not been adopted by the
courts for purposes of review of agency action. Rather the courts
have usually required the plaintiff to show something more before
he is granted standing to challenge agency action. The nature of this
additional requirement varies with the situation; generally, however,
the plaintiff has been required to demonstrate the applicability to
his claim of one of four means of attaining standing: (1) a legal
right created by common law; or (2) an express provision within a
statute for judicial review; or (3) section IO(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)/' commonly referred to as the "standing"
provision; or (4) in the absence of a statutory provision for express
review, proof of an implied congressional grant of review based on
a legislative purpose to protect the plaintiff's interest.
A. Tennessee Power:

The Legal-Wrong Test

For thirty years the leading case in the law of standing was
Tennessee Electric Power Company v. TVA.6 In that case, the
Supreme Court gave the "legal wrong test" 7-which became the
central standard for determining questions of standing-its most
prominent and influential application. In Tennessee Power, nineteen
power companies sought to challenge the constitutional validity of
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Despite the uncontroverted
fact of financial damage to the plaintiffs, the court found that they
had no right derived from common law, statute, or franchise to be
free from competition:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with di4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Flast involved a challenge by a taxpayer to
a federal program that financially aided parochial schools. In addition to requiring
the plaintiff to prove injury in fact, the Court in Flast required the plaintiff to prove
that a "logical nexus" existed between his status as a taxpayer and a specific constitutional limitation on the congressional taxing and spending power in the Constitution. 392 U.S. at 102-03. Thus it is not clear whether injury in fact is the "constitutional" minimum or whether a nexus appropriate to the particular type of action is
required. For analyses of Flast, see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L.
REv. 601 (1968), and The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 224-31 (1968).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964),
6. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113 (1940), and
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) for applications of the legal-wrong
test.
7. The legal-wrong test was most prominently expounded in Tennessee Power,
in which the Court stated that to challenge a statute, a plaintiff must show that there
has been a "violation of his legal rights" and that the "right invaded is a legal
right." 306 U.S. at 137. Thus the plaintiff must establish that a "legal wrong" was
inflicted upon him.
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rect and special injury by the act of an agent of the government which,
but for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation
of his legal rights, may challenge the validity of the statute in a suit
against the agent. The principle is without application unless the
right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of
contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on
a statute which confers a privilege.8
The plaintiffs in Tennessee Power argued that when Congress
established a federally :financed hydroelectric system it had violated
their rights to engage in and carry on the business of supplying
electrical power free of governmentally sponsored competition. The
plaintiffs contended that they must be granted standing to bring
their suit in order to protect this legal right. 9 The Supreme Court
rejected the power companies' position and held that they failed to
meet the legal-·wrong test, and that such a test must be met in order
to be allowed standing to contest governmental action. 10 The Court
held that the plaintiffs did not possess any substantive right to be
free of governmentally sponsored competition.11 Failure to enjoy
such a legal right meant, conversely, that when the Government
established the TVA these companies had suffered no legally cognizable "wrong." Rather, as noted above,12 the Supreme Court required
an immediate inquiry into the nature of the claim asserted by the
plaintiff. In large measure, this inquiry was one conducted on the
merits, for the Court only looked to see whether some common-law
property right had been violated.13 If such a right had not in fact
been violated, then the Court was not willing to say that a legally
recognized wrong had occurred for purposes of standing. The
Supreme Court decided Tennessee Power at a time when the federal
bureaucracy was on the threshold of an enormous expansion. Unfortunately, in formulating the rigid legal-wrong test in that case,
the Court did not recognize the necessity of providing significant
judicial checks on the conduct of the mushrooming bureaucracy.H
8. 306 U.S. at 137-38.
9. 306 U.S. at 124-25. Cf. Frost v. Corporation Commn., 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (plaintiffs had standing to challenge the grant of a license to a competitor based on a
government franchise).
10. 306 U.S. at 137-38.
11. 306 U.S. at 139.
12. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
13. 306 U.S. at 137-39.
14. See Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
923 (1970) (challenge by attorney to competition arising from government-sponsored
legal-aid programs); South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 285 F. Supp.
676 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd., 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969) (challenge by bus line to federally
financed municipal transit system). See also the cases discussed in note 16 infra, in
which various bank competitors challenged the rulings of the Comptroller of the
Currency; Rasmussen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970) (challenge by state
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Over the years, the defects of the Tennessee Power doctrine have
become evident. The plight of the plaintiff who desires to challenge
allegedly illegal agency action has been perceptively described by
Professor Davis:
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always has
standing if a legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right
of the plaintiff is not at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has standing
and sometimes lacks standing. Circular reasoning is very common, for
one of the questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff
has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but the
question whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion,
for if the plaintiff has standing his interest is a legally-protected
interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right.115
In other words, the legal-wrong test has required that the determination whether standing exists be based not on the personal stake of
the party, but on a circular, conclusory process by which the merits
are resolved in order to justify a decision of standing. Very simply,
the fundamental objection to the test is that it goes to the merits.
Again, Professor Davis has summarized this objection to the legalwrong test: "What happens repeatedly is, in effect, that injury to the
plaintiff plus illegality of the governmental action equals standing;
the essence of many opinions is that injury plus illegality equals a
legal right."16 Certainly if a plaintiff fails to establish the violation
public-service commission to discontinuance of railroad operations by Post Office
Dept.); Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965) (challenge by growers and nonresident Mexican nationals to immigration eligibility): Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d
570 (8th Cir. 1962) (challenge by farmers to relocation of Dept. of Agriculture office).
15. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 22.04, at 217.
16. Davis, supra note 4, at 621. Professor Davis' analysis is demonstrated in cases in
which competitors of banks that had been authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to engage in nonbank activities challenged the Comptroller's rulings. In Baker,
Watts &: Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. sub nom. Port of N.Y.
Authority v. Baker, Watts &: Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968), an investment-banking
firm challenged a Comptroller's ruling that allowed banks to underwrite and deal in
general obligations of states and their political subdivisions that were not supported
by the taxing power. The district court attempted to distinguish the case from the line
of cases following Tennessee Power. But in the process it still focused on the merits in
deciding the standing issue:
While no one may maintain a suit to restrain lawful competition merely because
he is suffering an economic detriment, nevertheless, a person has a standing to
complain against illegal competition, or specifically, against competition on the part
of a person who lacks the legal right or power to pursue the competitive activities.
261 F. Supp. at 248. Significantly, the court later decided that the Comptroller had
no authority under applicable federal statutes to allow banks to engage in such activities. But only after this determination was the standing issue resolved. Instead of
analyzing the personal stake of the plaintiff or any congressional intent to provide
reviewability by him, the court relied on the substantive outcome to determine the
preliminary issue of standing.
This analytical fallacy was also displayed in Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent
Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the court held that the plaintiff
insurance agents had standing to contest a Comptroller's ruling that banks could act as
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of a legal right, a dismissal for failure to state a claim or cause of
action, rather than a dismissal for want of standing, would be the
appropriate judicial response.
B. Sanders: Provision for Express Review
The Court soon recognized the rigidity of the legal-wrong test,
and within two years after Tennessee Power it moved to establish
the first exception-albeit a very limited one-to that test. In FCC
v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 17 the plaintiff, an owner of a radio
station, sought judicial review of the grant of an operating license to
an applicant. The plaintiff claimed only that it had suffered economic harm from the competition. The Federal Communications
Act allowed an appeal by any "person aggrieved or whose interests
are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or
refusing any such application."18 On the basis of this provision, the
Court held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the grant of
the license to its competitor.
Rather than applying the rigid test of Tennessee Power in this
statutory context, the Court looked to the congressional purposes
in passing the Federal Communications Act and to the policies
evident in that Act. Although the competitor could not demonstrate
that it had been subjected to a legal wrong, the Court found that
the plaintiff did have sufficient interest as a competitor to justify
conferring standing in the proceedings.19 The Court construed the
review provision of the Federal Communications Act broadly as an
express grant of standing to the plaintiff-competitor.20 The Court
insurance agencies incident to banking transactions. Such activities were statutorily
limited to places that had populations that did not exceed 5000 people. Nevertheless,
the Comptroller attempted to justify his ruling on his general rule-making authority.
Although presented with a rather straightforward case on the merits, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit devoted most of its opinion to justifying its holding that
the plaintiff had standing. The court distinguished the case before it from Tennessee
Power because in the instant case, the government-sponsored competition was "unlawful," whereas in Tennessee Power, it was "lawful." 899 F.2d at 1016. The result in
Saxon was doubtless an appropriate one from a policy viewpoint. Nevertheless, it was
unfortunate that the court was driven to such a strained analysis in order to reach
its desired result. This type of analysis employed by the court has been criticized by
Judge Burger, in his concurring opinion in National Assn. of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420
F.2d 83, 107 (D;C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. granted, 897 U.S. 986 (1970) (No. 885,
1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term):
Quite often courts pursued a "bootstrap" or circular logic by initially analyzing
the merits, in order that a finding of standing to challenge actions seems more
palatable because the court has already found a possible encroachment of "rights"
which it desires to review. To evaluate standing solely or even primarily on such
visceral reactions does violence to the judicially created concepts of standing ••••
See pt. V infra for a discussion of the case.
17. ll09 U.S. 470 (1940).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964), quoted at ll09 U.S. at 476-77.
19. ll09 U.S. at 476-77.
20. ll09 U.S. at 476-77.
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justified this broad interpretation of the provmon on the policy
ground that competitors were "the only person having a sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of
law." 21 Thus, instead of applying a formal legal-wrong test, the
Court looked to the relevant legislative history and formulated a
new test that required a plaintiff to demonstrate only an actual
private injury in order to assert the public interest in the limited
situations-such as was presented in Sanders-in which an express
statutory provision for review existed. To this extent, Sanders, and
the test formulated in that case, has been applied to a separate segment of the law of standing and has coexisted with Tennessee Power
and the test of that case over the years. 22

C. The Administrative Procedure Act
In 1946 Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act,23
which provided that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 24 The
APA was designed to limit the unchecked power of federal administrative agencies by providing a minimum standard of review in the
absence of an express review provision in the relevant statute.25
Thus, if a regulatory statute did contain an express review provision,
that provision would be applied by a court, as was done by the Court
in Sanders. 26 In the absence of such a provision, the APA would
apply. The lower courts have consistently held that the AP A merely
codified existing law-the Tennessee Power legal-wrong theory. 27
21. !109 U.S. at 477. Professor Jaffe has argued that Congress was not interested or
concerned about encouraging private individuals to protect the public interest, and he
found no basis in the legislative history for the Court's discovery of such an intent.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 522 (1965).
22. The progeny of Sanders has further liberalized review under the Federal
Communications Act, extending standing to challenge license renewals to a manufacturer of consumer electronic products, Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir.
1958), and listening groups, Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, !159 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Standing To Protest and
,-1ppeal the Issuance of Broadcasting Licenses: A Constricted Concept Redefined, 68
YALE L.J. 78!1 (1959); Recent Development, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 518 (1967).
2!1. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. !124, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 2!17-44, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-11 (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) [hereinafter APA].
24. APA § IO(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a)
(1964).
25. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess, !I0-31 (1945).
26. 309 U.S. at 477.
27. The leading case is Kansas City Power 8c Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). However, the same court has rec•
ognized that the weight of McKay "has been greatly reduced" and has therefore adopted
the position of Professor Davis (see note 28 infra and accompanying text) that the APA
greatly expanded standing. Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Professor Davis, on the other hand, has argued that the APA significantly expanded the availability of standing in that it requires only
that a party prove that he was adversely affected in fact; 28 but his
view has not received much support in the courts.29
D. Hardin: Implied Review
The law of standing to challenge agency action remained fairly
static until 1968, when the Supreme Court decided Hardin v.
Kentucky Utilities Company. 30 In Hardin, a private power company
sought review of the expansion of TVA services into its market area
by alleging the violation of a statute that prohibited TVA expansion
after a stated date.31 It has long been settled that possession of an
express government-granted franchise or license entitles the bearer
to standing to challenge the granting of any additional governmentissued franchises. 32 In Hardin, however, the power company could
not claim that an express government franchise furnished it protection from competition; instead it had to rely on only the implication of such protection from a regulatory statute. In the absence of
an express provision for judicial review in the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act, the Supreme Court undertook an examination of the
pertinent legislative history. From this inquiry it drew the inference
A number of cases in other jurisdictions have followed McKay: Braude v. Wirtz, 350
F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965); Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962); HarrisonHalsted Community Group v. Housing &: Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1962).
28. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 22.02, at 211-13. Professor Davis' argument, however,
turns on limited support in the legislative history of the APA and on the interpretation
that the phrase "within the meaning of a relevant statute" modifies only "aggrieved"
and not "affected" (see text accompanying note 24 supra). However, other commentators
have disagreed. See, e.g., Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judidal Review: Private Actions, 75
HARV. L, R.Ev. 255, 287-88 (1961), and Note, Competitors' Standing To Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 843 (1956) (both asserting that
the APA only codified the existing law of standing). Professor Davis has also argued that
the phrasing of the APA is so similar to numerous regulatory statutes-for example, the
statute at issue in Sanders (see text accompanying note 18 supra)-as to indicate that
Congress intended to incorporate the approach of Sanders into the APA. Thus, a plaintiff could obtain standing merely by establishing injury in fact. Davis, supra note 4, at
618-19.
29. The position of Professor Davis was expressly rejected in Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1151 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 315,
affd. on remand, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), revd. and remanded, 39 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S.
Nov. 24, 1970) (per curiam) (see notes 84 &: 92 infra). Other courts have impliedly rejected the position of Professor Davis in holding that the APA only codified existing
law. See note 27 supra.
30. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the Hardin line of cases, see Comment,
The Congressional Intent To Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing
Barrier, 41 u. COLO. L. R.Ev. 96 (1969).
31. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 § 15d(a), 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(a) (1964),
quoted at 390 U.S. at 3 n.l.
32. Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka &: Santa Fe R.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Alton R.R.
Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), Cf. Frost v. Corporation Commn., 278 U.S. 515
(1929).
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that the "primary purpose" of the statute was to benefit the plaintiff's
interests.33 The Court held that a finding of an implicit congressional
intent to benefit the plaintiff was a sufficient justification to grant
him standing.34
The Hardin test represented a major breakthrough in the law of
standing. For the first time in over thirty years, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could seek review absent either a legal injury
or express congressional permission. The usefulness of the Hardin
test has been limited, however, by the difficulty inherent in conducting the required probe into legislative history in order to ascertain
·what the congressional intent was in enacting a particular statute.

II. THE FUNCI10N

OF STANDING: LIBERALIZED OR

LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW

A strict reading of Tennessee Power and the cases that followed
it would limit greatly the opportunities for plaintiffs to challenge
decisions of federal administrative agencies. Yet public policy clearly
requires that these agencies be subject to some sort of effective
judicial review. Without such review the exercise of the vast power
vested by Congress in these agencies would be subject to no effective
check at all. It is clear that in order to facilitate effective, independent review of administrative decision-making, the test of standing
must not obstruct the goal of providing a forum in which the legal
issues concerning the public interest may be litigated most appropriately. However, courts frequently express doubt about their competency to deal with the detailed and complex issues that arise when
questions concerning the administration of government programs
are presented.35 Critics of expanded judicial review might fear that
such review, rather than furthering public goals, would actually
serve to impede the administrative efficiency of these programs.36
The critics might also express concern that the enhanced prominence
of the judiciary in administrative decision-making would be contrary
to the principle of separation of powers in the national government.
Moreover, they might argue that increased judicial involvement
311. 390 U.S. at 6-7.
M. 390 U.S. at 7.
35. Cf. Rural Elec. Admin. v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 700 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Community Natl. Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp.
514, 518-19 (E.D. Mich. 1961), affd. as modified, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962). See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion", 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968). For a thoughtful appraisal of the risks and
limits of judicial review, see Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's
Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 201 (1970).
36. The critia of expanded review might contend that administrators would be
inhibited from firm decision-making by a desire to avoid review and remand of a
controversy, by the delays caused by trials and appeals, and by the conflicting decisions of courts of various jurisdictions.
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could create an image of a judiciary that is attempting to usurp the
role of an elected executive branch in making public-policy decisions
or interpreting congressionally dictated policies.37 In the most extreme circumstances, particularly unpopular judicial decisions might
precipitate judicial confrontations with the executive branch in
enforcing decisions against recalcitrant agencies or their administrators. Finally, the critics might argue that an already oppressive
federal-court caseload would be substantially aggravated by liberalized judicial review. 38
However valid these objections to liberalized judicial review
may be, it is submitted that the doctrine of standing is an inappropriate doctrine to implement a policy of more limited judicial
review. Concededly, certain issues may be, by their nature, outside
the limits of judicial power or not readily susceptible to judicial
review. 39 However, a number of doctrines other than standing are
available to courts that desire not to decide such issues. Included
among these doctrines are ripeness, 40 exhaustion of remedies, 41
deference to agency discretion, 42 and the political question.43 Nevertheless, it would appear that courts have used the standing doctrine
to restrict judicial review of agency action, and that as a result, the
doctrine has served a number of unexpressed purposes. Professor
Davis has remarked that the retention of the legal-wrong test for so
many years was probably
37. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (1966) (additional statement of
Dean Envin N. Griswold):
The vice in the proposal to have "taxpayers' suits," it seems to me, lies in the idea
that ultimate power in our country should reside with the courts .••• The sorts
of questions which arise with respect to the spending power are, in my view,
better adopted for consideration and decision by the executive and legislative
branches of the Government than by the judiciary.
38. Professor Davis, however, argues to the contrary that the experience of state
courts that liberally allow standing does not support this fear, Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1967), and federal courts are increasingly rejecting this "floodgates" argument. See, e.g., Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d
859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also the statement by Judge Burger in
Office of Communications v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "The fears of
regulatory agencies that their processes will be inundated by expansion of standing
criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the expense of participation
in the administrative process ••••" The court also noted that the Commission could use
its inherent powers and rule-making authority to ease the impact of any increase in its
caseload caused by increased intervention. It would seem that the same analysis could be
applied to standing for judicial review.
39. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171 n.3 (1970) austice Brennan, concurring in the result and dissenting).
40. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 21.01.
41. Id. § 20.02.
42. 4 id. § 28.01.
43. Id.
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motivated by various ideas not appearing on the face of formal
opinions such as the notion that the law of standing can keep judges
from assuming too much governmental power, that it can limit
courts to appropriate subject matter, that it can help assure competent presentation of cases, and, above all, that it can protect
against a flood of litigation that might so much overburden the
courts as to produce a disastrous deterioration in the quality of all
that courts do.44

III.

DATA PROCESSING AND BARLOW

A. The Cases and the New Test
In 1970, the Supreme Court attempted to restore some order to
the confused law of standing in the companion cases of Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 45 and Barlow v. Collins.46 In Data Processing the Comptroller of the
Currency issued an interpretive ruling, pursuant to the National
Banking Act, 47 authorizing national banks to provide data-processing
services to their customers.48 The Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, whose members provide computer services
throughout the United States, and Data Systems, Inc., a servicing
corporation, filed suit contesting the validity of the Comptroller's
ruling. The plaintiffs claimed that the ruling violated a provision of
the National Banking Act that gives national banks only such
"incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking,''49 and that as a result of this ruling, the data-processing
industry would be faced with increased competition from which it
would incur substantial financial harm. 50 The district court51 and
the court of appeals52 both held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to challenge the Comptroller's ruling. Both lower courts
felt that the plaintiffs did not possess a private legal interest, had
44. Davis, supra note 38, at 469.
45. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). This case and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), are
discussed in Davis, supra note 38; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1,
177 (1970); Comment, Competitors' Standing To Challenge Administrative ActionRecent Federal Developments, 48 N.C. L. REv. 807, 826-30 (1970); Note, Standing To
Challenge Federal Administrative Action in the Wake of Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp, I LoYoLA (CHICAGO) L.J. 285 (1970); Recent Case, 23
VAND. L. REv. 814 (1970).
46. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
48. 397 U.S. at 151.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1964).
50. 397 U.S. at 152.
51. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675
{D, Minn. 1968).
52. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1969).
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not pleaded any legal harm recognized at law, and had not proved
that their status was one that placed them in a class protected by a
statute. 53
In Barlow, the Secretary of Agriculture amended regulations
issued pursuant to section 402(a) of the Food and Agriculture Act of
1965.54 The amendments resulted in an alteration of the balance of
economic power between tenant farmers and their landlords. The
regulations previously had provided that a farmer could assign his
government benefit payments "only as security for cash or advances
to finance making a crop ... .''55 The amended regulation redefined the
phrase "making a crop" to include the rent these tenants paid,
thereby permitting, for the first time, assignment of the benefit
payments to the landlords.56 Clemon Barlow and other tenant farmers
filed a suit against the Secretary in which they claimed that after the
amendment was issued they were required by their landlords to
execute a rent note as security for the cash rent, and thus were
deprived of their prior bargaining power with area merchants and
suppliers. The plaintiffs further claimed that such a result was
contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the Food and Agriculture Act. 57 In affirming the opinion of the district court that the
tenant farmers lacked standing to challenge the regulations, 58 the
court of appeals held that they lacked such standing because they
had failed to show a legally protected property right to be free from
the effect of the amendment and had failed to show any express or
implied legislative grant of standing to them. 59
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Data Processing60 and vacated and remanded Barlow. 61 The Court firmly rejected the legalwrong test that Tennessee Power had endorsed. 62 By so doing, it may
be inferred that the Court believed that considerations of public
policy clearly required that the test for standing be substantially
liberalized. The Court recognized that in the course of the thirty
years since Tennessee Power, the trend in the law of standing had
been "toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
administrative action." 63 The Court noted: "There is no presumption
53. 406 F.2d at 842-43; 279 F. Supp. at 678.
54. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), discussed at 397 U.S. at 160 n.l.
55. 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955), quoted at 397 U.S. at 161 n.2.
56. 7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1970), quoted at 397 U.S. at 162 n.3.
57. Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1968).
58. Barlow v. Minter, Civil No. 2494-N (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 1967).
59. 398 F.2d at 401.
60. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
61. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
62. 397 U.S. at 153: 397 U.S. at 164.
63. 397 U.S. at 154.
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against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism ... ,
unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme." 64
It is not at all clear, however, how far the Court's opinions in
Data Processing and Barlow go toward achieving the goal of opening
up the courts to judicial review of administrative actions. In place
of the old legal-wrong test, the Supreme Court has substituted a
two-pronged test to be utilized in determining whether standing
exists in any particular case. The first requirement is simply an
acknowledgment of the article III limitation in the Constitution
that restricts the judicial power of the federal courts to "cases" and
"controversies." 65 The Court stated that a plaintiff has satisfied this
constitutional minimum when he alleges that "the challenged action
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 66 The Court
then added a second requirement to its test. It stated that a plaintiff,
in order to establish his standing to bring the action, must assert
interests which are "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." 67

B. The Meaning of the New Test

In using such elastic words in its new test as "arguably" and
"zone," the Court apparently intended to vest great discretion in the
lower courts in their application of the test. The language employed
by the Court is sufficiently broad that it might reasonably be interpreted as creating a presumption in favor of according the plaintiff
standing. Such a presumption might apply if the plaintiff demonstrates merely a minimal possibility that the legislation in question
was intended to protect or regulate the interests that he is asserting.
If the opinion of the Court in Data Processing is so broadly interpreted, the test laid down by the Court would serve to eliminate
only purely frivolous suits. A sympathetic court would not often be
forced to strain the law to find that a plaintiff has interests that
"arguably" fall within some nebulous "zone" that Congress meant
to regulate or protect. Unfortunately, this interpretation is somewhat
a matter of speculation since the Court did not delineate
carefully the nature of the inquiry required by the new test and
left this most ambiguous standard open to a variety of conflicting
interpretations.68
The first area of ambiguity concerns the precise formulation of
64. 397 U.S. at 157.
65. U.S. CoNsr. art. ill, § 2, discussed at 397 U.S. at 151.
66. 397 U.S. at 152. The Court pointed out that standing "may stem from" injury
to noneconomic interests such as aesthetics or conservation. 397 U.S. at 154.
67. 397 U.S. at 153.
68. The test has been criticized in Davis, supra note 38, at 458-68.
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the second requirement of the new test. In Data Processing, the
Court stated that the interests asserted must be arguably within the
"zone of interests" 69 protected or regulated by the statute. However,
in applying this test, the Court noted that a competitor of the regulated bank was within the "zone of interests," 70 and in the Barlow
case it observed that the tenant farmers were within this zone.71
Whether it is the "interests" or the "persons" that are the focus of
examination is not merely an issue of semantics. An inquiry into
whether a "person" is within the "zone of interests" indicates a
different view of the nature of standing and its scope of application
than does an inquiry into whether a particular "interest" is within
that zone. On the one hand, if the plaintiff must be within the zone,
then he must prove that he is an intended beneficiary of the statute.
In effect, he must establish that Congress has impliedly conferred
upon the limited class of which he is a member the right to protection against the type of harm that Congress intended to prohibit. He
is asserting primarily a private right, and the public interest that
Congress considered when it sought to regulate governmental or
private encroachments on the plaintiff's statutory rights is only
incidentally furthered. On the other hand, if the interest must be
within the protected zone, then the relationship of the particular
plaintiff to those interests is irrelevant and need not be examined.
The plaintiff is asserting and furthering public interests in bringing
his action. The personal injury he has suffered is only relevant in
establishing the constitutional minimum of injury in fact. 72
A decision to follow the "persons" approach rather than the
"interests" approach would dictate substantially different outcomes
in many cases because the "persons" test is more restrictive than the
"interests" test. If the former is used, the plaintiff must prove that
Congress intended to protect him-i.e., his interests. This may often
entail a ponderous review of legislative history in order to extract
sometimes obscure and inscrutable statements of legislators' intent
to protect the plaintiff. If the latter test is used, the plaintiff merely
must prove that he is furthering the interests that Congress sought to
protect, which may or may not have been his interests. This "interest" test becomes, therefore, a mere pleading requirement since a
brief inquiry into the statutory materials can reveal a general congressional purpose to protect certain interests that the plaintiff can
then incorporate into his pleadings. It does not have the effect of
excluding persons who are not intended beneficiaries of congressional
legislation.
69. 397 U.S. at 153.
70. 397 U.S. at 156.
71. 397 U.S. at 164.
72. See 397 U.S. at 152; 397 U.S. at 173 n.6 Gustice Brennan, concurring in the result
and dissenting).
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Perhaps the differences between these two extreme formulations
of the Data Processing test may be illustrated best by a hypothetical
situation based upon a variation of the fact situation in Barlow.73
Assume that a merchant had been financially injured when farmers
had cancelled orders for merchandise because of the assignment of
benefit payments to their landlords. Under the "interests" approach,
the merchant would probably qualify to assert the interests of the
tenant farmers, which were generally protected by the relevant
statute, in a challenge of the new regulation. However, under the
"persons" approach that requires the plaintiff to be within the zone,
the merchant would not have standing unless he could demonstrate
that he, and not the farmer, was ·within the intended protection of
Congress. Thus standing would be expanded or contracted depending on which formulation of the Data Processing the test is employed.
Presumably, this confusion about what test the Court intended
to set out in Data Processing results from inadvertent phraseology
in the Court's opinion.74 However, a close reading of Data Processing
and Barlow does not clearly reveal which is the more likely
interpretation intended by the Court. On the one hand, it can be
argued that the Court intended to establish a test based upon
reference to protected "interests." In support of this contention it is
possible to argue that the "interest" formulation is first set out
within the context of a general discussion of standing,75 and that
this discussion establishes a general rule for administrative review.
The statements by the Court that the competitors and the farmers
were within the protected zone 76 arguably can be dismissed as statements peculiar to the facts of Data Processing and Barlow, since in
those cases the persons whose interests were protected happened also
to be the plaintiffs. In support of the "persons" interpretation, on
the other hand, it must be noted that in both applications of the
test, the Court examined only the interests of the plaintiffs. Such a
limited examination may indicate a requirement that the plaintiffin order to be granted standing-must himself be an intended
beneficiary of the applicable statute. In addition, the "persons"
interpretation is more consistent with the Hardin test of implied
review. 77 In contrast, an "interest" test would be a major departure
from prior law, and such a departure arguably would have been
more clearly signalled by the Court. A definitive interpretation of
the test must await future cases. 78
73. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra •.
74. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
75. 397 U.S. at 153-54.
76. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
78. Since the Supreme Court announced its decisions in Data Processing and Barlow,
the lower courts have been afforded a few opportunities to utilize the new test. See
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Perhaps a middle ground can be discerned from the opinions
that may reconcile the two extreme interpretations of the Data
Processing test. The Court may have meant that the interests of the
plaintiff must be within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by statute. This interpretation would obviate the logical difficulty
in phrasing the test so that the "person" must be within the zone of
interests. Although it is clear that "interests" may be within the zone
of interests, it does not seem either grammatically or logically conceivable that "persons" are "interests" protected by a statute. Thus,
the language of the Court in Barlow to the effect that the "tenant
farmers" were within the requisite zone may be interpreted to mean
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (five
environmental organizations have standing to appeal refusal by Secretary of the
Agriculture to ban chemical DDT under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-35k (1964)); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (six individuals, including five mothers who
presently or intend in the future to breast-feed their babies, and an environmental
group, have standing under the FIFRA to seek review of denial by the Secretary of
HEW of their petition to ban DDT); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (several local and national conservationist groups have standing to challenge the proposal for an expressway under three federal laws designed to
protect the environment); Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970) (steel
producer has standing to protest the order of the Foreign Trade Zone Board establishing
a free-trade zone in Armco's market area; the court cited Data Processing, but also cited
the Hardin "classes protected" test to support its holding of standing); Ballerina Pen
Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S.
Aug. 14, 1970) (No. 545) (competitor of manufacturer of blind-made products has
standing to challenge the actions of the Committee on Purchases of Blind-Made
Products and the General Services Administration in including ball point pens in a
special procurement procedure established by the Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48
(1964)); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (individuals in area and
group on their behalf have standing under the APA to challenge proposed project to
flare gas contained in cavity created by nuclear detonation). But see Sierra Club v.
Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Nov.
15, 1970) (No. 939) (Sierra Club cannot challenge Mineral King Valley project because
the club has failed to show any injury in fact to itself or its members). Many of these
cases have arisen in the area of environmental control. On the whole the courts in these
cases have liberally defined the "zone of interests" protected by the environmental
statutes.
Thus far, the courts have required individual plaintiffs to demonstrate only a
present or reasonably foreseeable harm to their health or safety. See Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083, 1085 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The burden of
a plaintiff organization to demonstrate that it falls within a protected "zone of interests" has been even milder. These organizations have been required to demonstrate
only a continuing interest in the protection of the environment. See Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Significantly, one
court has interpreted Data Processing to hold that § l0(a) of the APA (see note 24
supra and accompanying text), rephrased as the "zone of interests" test, requires only
injury in fact to confer standing. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1970) petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1970) (No. 939).
That court's holding that the Sierra Club had not suffered the requisite injury in fact
is questionable. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, the statute under which the
suit was brought contained a "persons aggrieved" review provision. The court held
that injury in fact was sufficient, but rather than citing Sanders, the court relied on
Data Processing and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (428 F.2d at 1096 n.12), which
may imply that the Data Processing test requires only injury in fact.
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that the interests of tenant farmers were within that zone. 79 This
third formulation would be, in effect, a modification of the Hardin
test, and yet would not present either the logical difficulties inherent
in a "person" formulation or the sharp break from earlier law that
an "interest" formulation would entail.
C. The Difficulties in Applying the New Test

The effect that Data Processing and Barlow may have on the
authority of the Court's decision in Hardin is not clear. In that case,
it will be remembered, the Court said that in order for the plaintiff
to be granted standing, a primary purpose of the statute must be to
protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member. 80 In
Data Processing, the Court mentioned the Hardin line of cases in
discussing the evolution of standing theories,81 but did not expressly
rely on that authority or apply the test used in Hardin. 82
Irrespective of whether the new test is formulated in terms of
the "plaintiff's interests" or in terms of the "plaintiff himself," it
appears that this test has modified the Hardin "class of persons"
test so that the focus of any statutory inquiry will be shifted from
the question of which particular parties are protected by statute to
the broader question of which interests are protected. This change
will likely permit an expanded inquiry into the policy objectives of
a statute and, at the same time, relieve a court from determining
which group of persons initiated or sponsored the legislation that
was enacted into law. In a determination of the status of the actual
plaintiff before the court, the phrase "plaintiff's interests are within
the zone of interests" might be more conducive to this broadened
analysis than the alternative formulation-"plaintiff is within the
zone"-since the court could look to interests in appraising the status
of the plaintiff rather than the intended role of beneficiary that he
may play in the statutory scheme. This latter distinction seems
largely theoretical and semantic; as a practical matter, rephrasing
the test from "class of persons" to "zone of interests" protected will
encourage the different legislative analysis described above.
An examination of the facts in Data Processing reveals the
differences between the "class of persons" and "zone of interests"
tests. The relevant statute in that case only prohibited bank service
corporations owned by banks from performing banking activities. 83
79. !197 U.S. at 164.
80. See text accompanying notes llll-!14 supra.
81. !197 U.S. at 154-56.
82. See text accompanying notes llll-!14 supra.
8!1. See note 90 infra.
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However, the plaintiffs were complaining of competition from banks,
not bank service corporations. Under a Hardin analysis, a literal
reading of the statute would render it inapplicable since the plaintiffs were not members of the class protected-competitors of bank
service corporations. However, an analysis of the "zone of interests"
protected would be more likely to produce the result actually reached
by the Court-that Congress intended to protect the plaintiffs from
bank-sponsored competition in general, not merely competition from
bank service corporations.
The new test enunciated in Data Processing may be useful to
plaintiffs in a variety of factual contexts. First, if a statute protects
against competition generally, without specifying the beneficiaries,
it is more likely now that a court will infer that a particular competitor-for example, a data-processing company-is within the zone of
protection from competition for purposes of determining standing. 8 '
Under the Hardin test, however, the court might have required the
statutory language and history to refer specifically to the plaintiffcompetitor as the beneficiary of the legislation.
Second, confusion may occasionally arise over what statute a
court should look to in determining whether Congress established
a protected "zone of interests." For example, while a plaintiff may
have been iniured through an alieged violation of one specific statute, it may be that neither he nor his interests were the intended
beneficiaries of that statute. It is possible, however, that, in another
statute, Congress has indicated a desire to protect the very interest
the olaintiff now asserts. Prior to Data Processing it would have been
unlikely that a plaintiff in such a situation could have established
standing. The requirement of the AP A that a plaintiff be aggrieved
''within the meaning of a relevant statute" 85 probably would have
been interpreted as equating the "relevant statute" with the statute
that was allegedly violated. Under Data Processing the wording of the
APA now appears to have been interpreted as synonymous with the
"zone of interests" test, and this broader standard might well lead
to a different result. 86 A court might now be free to analyze both
84. Sl'e. e.f!., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968). affd ..
408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 315, affd. on remand, 428
F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), revd. and remanded, 39 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970) (per
curiam), in which the Supreme Court, interpreting its opinions in Data Processing and
Barlow, overruled the lower courts' denial of standing:
Here, as in Data Processing, we are concerned with § 4 of the Bank Services
Corporation Act. In Data Processing we did not rely on any legislative history
showing Conl?T("SS desired to protect data processors alone from competition,
39 U.S.L.W. at 3226.
Thus, the Court does not seem to require that the particular plaintiff be the exore~~
beneficiary of congressional protection. but only that he faU within a more general
class of competitors who are within the zone of interests protected by statute.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
86. Although the Supreme Court had not expressly considered the standing provi•
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statutes that are arguably applicable in determining which general
interests are protected. Although this precise issue does not appear
to have been decided by the Court in Data Processing, it is quite
likely to be raised in the future-especially in the area of environmental control-by plaintiffs who would once have been deterred
from entering into litigation by the rigid law of standing.
Whatever formulation of the Data Processing test is finally
adopted, the new test contains hazards similar to those that existed
under the Hardin test. First, it should be noted that both extreme
formulations of the Data Processing test necessarily require an
inquiry, however brief, into the merits of the plaintiff's case. 87 A
plaintiff must undoubtedly prove that the administrative agency has
misinterpreted or misapplied a statute in order to succeed on the
merits. And the questions that must be answered in order to make this
determination will be the same ones that are relevant to the "zone of
interests" standing test: what activity was Congress attempting to
encourage or preclude, what particular grievances moved Congress
to action, which parties were especially in need of protection, and
what countervailing considerations were considered by Congress in
limiting the regulation to its expressed scope? The answers to these
questions will often be culled from legislative history as well as from
the statute on its face. It may be that the standards ultimately devised
by the courts to determine legislative intent will be more onerous
when the merits of the case are at stake than they will be when
standing is the primary issue. Nevertheless, to the extent that both
formulations of the "zone of interests" test require an inquiry into
sion of § IO(a) of the APA (see note 24 supra and accompanying text) prior to Data
Processing, the lower courts had consistently interpreted that provision as being merely
a codification of the legal-wrong test of the Tennessee Power case. See notes 23-29 supra
and accompanying text. In view of the Court's express disavowal of the legal-wrong test
in Data Processing (see text accompanying note 62 supra), this position is no longer
tenable. The Court did not state explicitly that it was interpreting the APA. Nevertheless, while the language of the Court is not without some ambiguity, the Court
apparently has taken the opportunity in Data Processing to interpret § IO(a) for the
first time. The Court seems to have equated the language of § lO(a) entitling a person
who has been "aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" to judicial review
with the test formulated in Data Processing that a plaintiff need only be "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ••••" 397 U.S.
at 153. The Court stated:
The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of standing is
different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing
to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute."
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
397 U.S. at 153-54.
87. & the interest required to be brought within the "zone" becomes more
specific, standing will become more restrictive and the test may begin to resemble the
legal•wrong test in theory and effect.
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the merits, the tests are inconsistent with a theory of standing that
requires only the minimum of "personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy."88
Second, an examination of legislative history often presents
serious difficulties. Legislative history frequently gives little indication of who was intended to be the beneficiary of legislation or of
the scope of protection beyond the express language of the statute.
The testimony of witnesses, the reports of committees, and the
debates among congressmen may generate a wide variety of reasons,
sometimes contradictory, for the passage of the legislation under
consideration. 89 Al; an analytical tool, such an inquiry may encourage
courts to adopt a result-oriented approach-courts would conclude
that standing should or should not be conferred on unexpressed
policy grounds, but would support their decisions by a broad or
narrow reading of the legislative history. The decisions of the courts
of appeals in two factually related cases demonstrate the perils
inherent in an analysis of legislative history. In Data Processing, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the application of
the legislative history of the Bank Service Corporation Act (BSCA),90
which prohibited bank service corporations from performing nonbanking services for anyone other than banks, because in the factual
context of Data Processing, a bank, not a service corporation, was
performing the services. 91 However, in Wingate Corporation v.
Industrial National Bank,92 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
applied the legislative history of the BSCA to the same factual setting93 and found that Congress had intended to protect competitors
from both bank service corporations and banks.94 Although, as a
88. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
89. See Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 957,
968 (1940).
90. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1964). Section 1864 of the Act provides: "No bank service
corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services
for banks."
91. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 843
n.12 (8th Cir. 1969).
92. 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 987 (1970). The First Circuit
consolidated Wingate with Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, which was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. 397 U.S. 315 (1970) (per curiam). See note 84 supra.
93. In Wingate, as in Data Processing, the plaintiff was a computer service corporation and the defendant was a bank competing with the plaintiff.
94. 408 F .2d at 1152-53. The legislative history cited by the court in Wingate revealed
that the primary purpose of the Act was the protection of the solvency of banks. The
committee reports revealed no intent to protect any industry from the competition of
banks.
The difficulties in deciphering legislative intent were reflected in another case
involving the Comptroller's rulings. In Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins.
Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), the court found that the plaintiff insurance agents
had standing to review a Comptroller's ruling that banks could act as insurance agencies
incident to banking transactions, although such activities were statutorily limited to
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result of the decision in Data Processing, only an "arguable" degree
of statutory protection must be shown,95 courts might still differ
over the proper interpretation to be given statutory language and
history, and thus might also differ in resolving the question whether
the requisite statutory protection has been demonstrated.
The Court's application of the new test to the facts in Data
Processing and Barlow highlights the perplexities of statutory analysis and the continuing uncertainty over the proper formulation of
the new test. In Data Processing the Supreme Court relied on the
Wingate decision to support its holding that a competitor is within
the zone of interests protected by the banking statutes.96 But the
portion of the Wingate decision quoted by the Court does not
support this proposition because it only reveals that the BSCA was
designed to protect the financial stability of banks, not to protect
competitors. In another portion of the opinion in Wingate the First
Circuit cited the fact that the banking legislation was a response to
the concerns of the National Association of Public Accountants,
which sought protection for its members from bank competition.97
Yet this latter portion of the Wingate decision is not cited by the
Court in Data Processing. If one assumes the proper formulation
of the new test to be that "persons" must be "within the zone of
interests," the Court in Data Processing clearly did not support a
finding of standing under its own test since it did not satisfactorily
demonstrate that Congress intended to protect competitors.
places that had populations not exceeding 5000. Unsuccessful attempts to repeal the
provision were cited by the court to demonstrate a congressional intent to protect in•
surance agents from bank competition, but no such intent was found in the original
passage of the Act. !199 F.2d at 1018.
95. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
96. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in [Wingate] that by reason of § 4
a data processing company has standing to contest the legality of a national bank
performing data processing services for other banks and bank customers:
"Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the service corporations.
It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such
a prohibition, the bill would have enabled 'banks to engage in a nonbanking
activity,' S. Rep. No. 2105, (87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-121 (Supplemental views of
Senators Proxmire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and tlius constitute 'a serious
exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.'
(Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark). We think Congress has
provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the competition
may not be the precise kind Congress legislated against.''
397 U.S. at 155.
97. 408 F.2d at 1152-53. The Court could have also cited a statement by Senator
Proxmire, a sponsor of the bill that became the Bank Service Corporation Act, that
banks would have cost and market advantages over their nonbank competitors and
that
[a] number of these businesses have informed me and other Senators that this kind
of competition would be very unfair. It would be unfair because the bank could
use their own personnel charge, merely the out-of-pocket cost, and the unfair
competition could drive businesses now offering this kind of service to the wall.
108 CONG. REc. 22,031 (1962).
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However, this lack of support may imply that the Court looked
only to whether the interests sought to be protected by the complainant-for example, the financial stability of banks-were the public
interests of bank solvency rather than the personal interests of
protecting the plaintiff. Such an interpretation of the Court's analysis would lend support to the formulation of the test that only
general interests, not persons, must fall within the "zone of interests"
protected or regulated by Congress.
Moreover, if the interests of the particular plaintiff must be
asserted, then Barlow does not aid greatly in the determination of
the type or particularity of interest that must be shown. In Barlow,
the Court cursorily cited98 a general provision in the Food and Agriculture Act which stated that "the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall
provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants .... " 00
However, the Court could not point to any specific statutory language or legislative history that tended to show that Congress
recognized the particular interest of tenant farmers in the assignment
of benefits and that it intended to protect that interest. The problems inherent in any statutory analysis are, therefore, heightened by
the ambiguity of the new test. If the plaintiff is only required to
assert a general protection, then there is little substance left to the
test; if he is required to assert particular protection, then the court
is likely to have considerable difficulty in applying the test since
Congress often does not indicate its reasons for enacting specific
statutory provisions.
IV.

THE BRENNAN-WHITE POSITION-AN .ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

As an alternative to the approach taken by the majority in Data
Processing, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Barlow
joined by Justice White,100 offered his own views on how best to
resolve the question of standing to challenge the rulings of an administrative agency. Unlike the majority, Justice Brennan sharply distinguished the concept of standing from the concept of reviewability.
Justice Brennan noted that under the "zone of interests" test
adopted by the majority in Data Processing, a plaintiff is required
to prove that Congress has granted him a right of review in the
action brought by him.101 However, Justice Brennan contended that
such a requirement is inappropriate in resolving issues of standing.
According to Justice Brennan, an inquiry into standing should focus
solely on whether the party who institutes the action has a personal
98. 397 U.S. at 164.
99. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(10) (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
100. 397 U.S. at 167 austice Brennan, concurring in the :result and dissenting). This
opinion applied to Barlow and to Data Processing.
101. 397 U.S. at 168.
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adversary stake in the outcome of the litigation.102 Yet an inquiry into
the interests or class of persons protected by the relevant statutes demands an analysis of the merits of the case and is therefore alien to
the question of standing. Thus, the determination whether or not
Congress intended to give the plaintiff a right of judicial review is a
question to be decided in the separate area of law dealing with
reviewability. Justice Brennan noted that reviewability itself is
composed of two issues: whether anyone can challenge agency action,
and whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to judicial review.103
In order to establish reviewability of the substantive issues presented,
an examination of "[p]ertinent statutory language, legislative history,
and public policy considerations"104 is required to help determine
whether the "slight indicia that the plantiff's class is a beneficiary"105
of a statute supports the inference that Congress intended that
review be available to the plaintiff.
Justice Brennan's view that any inquiry into the "zone of interests protected" actually presents questions of reviewability rather
than standing is more than theoretically significant. Acceptance of
this view by the courts would not simply mean that under the Brennan test courts would dismiss actions on reviewability grounds because the plaintiff is not within a protected class, whereas under the
majority's test the same courts would dismiss actions on standing
grounds. Clearly different results might arise. First, the Supreme Court
has broadly interpreted the reviewability provision of the AP A, and
has held that it is a "seminal" Act under which "judicial review of a
final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress."106 Therefore, a strong inference-indeed, almost a presumption-arises that a plaintiff's case is reviewable. As noted
above,107 it is possible that the "zone of interests" test promulgated by
the majority in Data Processing will be broadly interpreted similarly
to require a presumption in favor of standing. It is clear, however,
that the majority was not willing explicitly to require such a presumption.
Moreover, it may be inferred from the flexibility of the wording
used by Justice Brennan to express his test for reviewability that he
would want to maintain the traditional presumption favoring the
plaintiff.108 Justice Brennan-in language that is much more explicit
102. ll97 U.S. at 172.
l0ll. ll97 U.S. at 169 n.2.
104. ll97 U.S. at 17ll.
105. ll97 U.S. at 175.
106. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, ll87 U.S. lll6, 140 (1967), interpreting§ 10 of the APA,
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
107. See text following note 67 supra.
108. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION !136-53 (1965).
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than that used by the majority-noted that public policy may be
more often furthered by conferring standing than by denying it.1 0°
Therefore, Justice Brennan would generally require only "slight
indicia that the plaintiff's class is a beneficiary."110 This presumption in favor of the plaintiff's right to challenge agency action
becomes even stronger when the "plaintiff is the only party likely to
challenge the action. Refusal to allow him review would, in effect,
commit the action wholly to agency discretion, thus risking frustration of the statutory objectives."111 Justice Brennan's approach would
obviate the continuing problem, demonstrated in a number of areas,
that the only parties that are likely to challenge important administrative determinations have not previously met the standing test. 112
The majority's test, however, does not meet these problems, although
its wording is sufficiently broad that courts might consider similar
public-interest factors under the guise of analyzing the interests
protected.
In contrast to the approach taken by Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion, the majority classified section lO(a) of the APA
as a hybrid standing-reviewability provision.113 By not employing
section IO(a) for standing purposes, Justice Brennan's analysis is
theoretically more sound than that of the majority in its exclusion
of any inquiry into the merits in the determination of standing.114
However, whether a challenge to the actions of an administrative
agency will be heard or not should depend on more than the conclusory labelling of a section of the APA as either one relating both to
standing and reviewability or solely to review·ability. Rather, any
difference in result should be founded on an interpretation of the
entire APA as a coherent whole and on relevant policy considerations. Although the legislative history of the APA would probably be
of minimal assistance in distinguishing "standing" from "reviewability"-two extremely technical concepts-the APA's general purposes
and remedial character could be beneficial in finally developing a
coherent and consistent interpretation of section IO of the Act.11 r;
In addition, the Court could balance the exigencies of liberalized
review and the presumption in favor of reviewability under the APA
109. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9.
110. 397 U.S. at 175.
111. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9.
112. See the discussions in notes 2, 14, 8e 16 supra and accompanying text.
113. The majority in Data Processing used APA § IO(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V,
1965-1969) both as a test for standing (397 U.S. at 153) and as a test for reviewability
(397 U.S. at 157).
114. 397 U.S. at 172-73.
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). See
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). The Court there cited the legislative history of the APA and its own cases interpreting it as evidencing "the basic presumption of judicial review" covering a "broad spectrum of administrative actions."

January 1971]

Comments

563

against traditional notions of judicial self-restraint. Standing and
reviewability should be interpreted consistently with each other. A
standing test that is more restrictive than a reviewability test would
undermine the latter if its effect were to make it too difficult for
many potential plaintiffs to obtain effective review of agency action.
However, an evaluation of these considerations is not undertaken by
either opinion in Data Processing. Consequently, important practical
differences depend instead on semantic and theoretical classifications.
The majority and Brennan opinions in Data Processing also
differ on the applicability in agency review cases of the doctrines
expressed in Flast v. Cohen.116 In Flast, the Court held that federal
taxpayers, claiming a violation of their first amendment rights, had
standing to challenge government financial aid to religious schools.
In order to obtain standing in that case, the plaintiff taxpayer was
required to show only that he had suffered sufficient personal injury
to ensure that the litigation would be a truly adversary one.117 The
majority in Data Processing stated that the standing requirement in
Flast did not "necessarily track" 118 the standing requirement in
suits to review agency action, although "the two have the same
Article III starting point." 119 The majority, therefore, did not apply
merely the constitutional minimum of injury in fact to the cases
before it. However, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion,
argued that the same standard utilized in Flast should be applied
in Data Processing and Barlow.120
The possible applicability of Flast to cases concerning review of
agency action raises more complex considerations than the majority
and concurring opinions in Data Processing suggest. Although Justice
Brennan seemed to ignore the point in his opinion in Barlow, the
Court actually went beyond the simple injury-in-fact test in its
decision in Flast. The Court in Flast required the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional
limitations upon the congressional taxing and spending power.121 In
a sense this test is analogous to the "zone of interests" test in that it
requires an implicit constitutional grant of standing in much the
same way that Data Processing requires an implicit legislative grant
of standing. The Data Processing test adopted by the majority might,
therefore, be more properly viewed as a modification of the Flast
test designed specifically for agency review cases.
In the final analysis, whether the simple constitutional minimum
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

392
392
397
397
897
!192

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

88 (1968).
at 99-100.
at 152.
at 152.
at 172-7!1.
at 102-04.
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or the more rigorous gloss that the Flast opinion imposed on the
availability of standing should be applied to agency actions is dependent on an evaluation of the judiciary's special role in our system
and its relationship with the other branches of government. Many
of the factors that are relevant in determining whether standing
should be liberalized are relevant to an analysis of this broader
policy issue as well.122 Unfortunately, the Court in Data Processing
did not conduct such a policy assessment; rather, it simply stated its
refusal to apply the constitutional minimum as its sole guide.123

V. A PRACTICAL .APPLICATION

OF THE NEW TEST

The degree of confusion that exists in the area of standing was
reflected in National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) v.
SEC, 124 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit a few months prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Data
Processing and Barlow. In that case, groups representing mutual
funds and mutual-fund salesmen sought review of an order of the
Comptroller of the Currency allowing nationally chartered banks to
operate collective investment funds. The plaintiffs alleged that the
ruling was inconsistent with and violated sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of
the Glass-Steagall Act.125 It was generally agreed that for purposes of
the APA the Glass-Steagall Act was the "relevant statute" under which
the action was brought. It was also clear that the Glass-Steagall Act, unlike the statute involved in the Sanders case,126 did not expressly grant
judicial review to all aggrieved parties. An examination of the relevant legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act revealed that the Act
was "not intended by Congress to protect mutual funds from competition from banks." 127 Rather, the Act was designed to promote the
solvency of banks by ensuring a separation of commercial banking
activity from dealing in securities.128
122. See pt. II supra.
123. 397 U.S. at 152-53. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
124. 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. granted, !!97 U.S. 986 (1970)
(No. 835, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term). See Comment, NA.SD v. SECStanding To Sue, Economic Power, Banks and Mutual Funds, 55 VA. L. R.Ev. 1493 (1969);
Case Comment, 50 B.U. L. R.Ev. 417 (1970).
125. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 (1964). Section 16 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(seventh) (1964), provides in part:
• • • The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national banking]
association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities or stock ••••
126. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
127. 420 F.2d at 96 Gudge Bazelon, concurring).
128. 420 F.2d at 99-100 Oudge Bazelon, concurring). The fact that the separation of
commercial banking and underwriting was the primary objective of the Glass-Steagall
Act was brought out in an earlier case dealing with the Act. In Baker, Watts &: Co. v.
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The court of appeals confessed genuine uncertainty concerning
how the standing issue might properly be resolved. In separate
opinions, Judges Bazelon129 and Burger130 recognized that although
the plaintiffs had suffered injury in fact as a result of the Comptroller's ruling, they did not seem to meet the requirements of any of
the established tests in order to be accorded standing. Both judges
concluded, however, that the plaintiffs were entitled to standing, and
seemed to base these conclusions on the belief that public policy
required prompt resolution of the issues raised by the plaintiffs on
the merits and no more appropriate plaintiffs seemed likely to appear
soon.131
A brief survey of the pre-Data Processing law relating to standing
clearly indicates the dilemma that the court faced in NASD. The
plaintiffs could not show any direct harm arising from the violation
of a contract, tort, or property right since the legal-wrong test first
promulgated in the Tennessee Power case clearly held that competitors had no right to be free from government-encouraged competition.132 Similarly, section IO(a) of the APA generally had been
interpreted as codifying the legal-wrong test,133 and thus plaintiffs
could not rely upon that provision to grant them standing. Even the
liberalized test for standing laid down by the Supreme Court in its
decision in Hardin required that the "primary purpose" of the
statute must be to protect the "class of persons" of which the plaintiff
is a member.134 As noted above,135 an analysis of the legislative intent
Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. sub nom. Port of N.Y. Authority v.
Baker, Watts&: Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968), discussed in note 16 supra, the district
court discussed the background of banking failures that precipitated the passage of the
Act. The court of appeals also discussed the legislative history of the Act in its examination of the merits of the Baker case. 392 F.2d at 498-502.
129. 420 F.2d at 96, 100.
130. 420 F.2d at 107-08.
131. Judge Bazelon stated, in holding that the Investment Company Institute, one
of the plaintiffs in NASD, had standing:
It is the only party likely to assert the public interest in observance of the banking
laws by the agency responsible for enforcing them. In the exceptional circumstances
of this case, I would grant the ICI standing to vindicate the public interest despite
the absence of a statutory aid to standing.
420 F.2d at 100. Judge Burger wrote:
... I am unable to set aside my grave doubts as to Appellees' standing to institute
and maintain these suits. However, in the uncertain state of the law as to standing,
there is something to be said on both sides of that question. I therefore resolve
my doubts in favor of the Appellees . • • • I am influenced substantially, as I
indicated at the outset, by the need for judicial examination of the important
questions raised.
420 F.2d at 108.
132. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 27 supra.
134. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
135. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
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clearly precluded a holding that mutual funds were intended to be
the primary beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Despite this vast amount of prior law and legislative history,
however, Judge Bazelon found the public-policy arguments for
granting standing persuasive:
It is fortuitous that there is no aid to standing for these plaintiffs.
I£ underwriters, insurance agents, data processors, and securities
dealers are right that banks are prohibited by law from entering
their businesses, Congress would never have foreseen that administrative rulings under the banking laws would substantially affect their
economic interests.1 36
It is submitted that NASD is precisely the type of case that the
Supreme Court attempted to anticipate in its decisions in Data
Processing and Barlow. Accordingly, in an attempt to put in some
sort of logical perspective the various theoretical dichotomies already
discussed in this Comment, the possible formulations of the new
test relating to the law of standing will be applied to the factual
setting in NASD.
It will be recalled that under the first possible formulation of
the Data Processing "zone of interests" test, the plaintiff himself
must fall "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ...." 137 The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall
Act does not indicate any congressional intent to protect mutual funds.
However, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933138-long before the
mutual-fund industry became a major factor in the investment
market.139 Therefore, it is arguable that the legislative history of the
statute may not even be relevant or appropriate to a resolution of
the standing issue in 1970. It would seem somehow absurd to determine the issue of standing upon the results of such an inquiry, but
this first formulation of the Data Processing test appears to require
an examination of legislative history. Unless some mention of protection for competitors in general could be discovered in the statutory
materials, under this formulation of the test the plaintiffs in NASD
would probably not have standing-even with the aid afforded by
the use of such flexible words as "arguably" and "zone."
I£ the Data Processing test were interpreted to require only that
a plaintiff's interests need be within the zone,140 the plaintiffs in
136. 420 F.2d at 99.
137. 397 U.S. at 153. See text following note 71 supra.
138. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
139. See I. FRIEND, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS app. tables
1-2, at 114 (1970), based on the Securities and Exchange Commission Statistical Bulletin
of May 1969:
Market Value of Stockholdings of Selected Classes of Investors (Billions of Dollars):
Total Stock
Mutual Funds
Outstanding
1940
$ 0.4
$ 77.'!,
1968
50.9
761.'!,
140. See text following note 78 supra.
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N ASD would have a greater likelihood of establishing standing. Although the narrow competitive interests of the plaintiffs probably
are not protected, the plaintiffs could assert that the interests protected by the statute are the safety, security, and stability of financial
markets and institutions in general. As financial institutions, mutual
funds operate in the financial markets and are simultaneously contributors to the safety of those markets and dependent on the safety
and solvency of other institutions, including banks. Thus, it is
possible that mutual funds are implied beneficiaries of the interests
of safety and solvency that are furthered by the Glass-Steagall Act.
Such an analysis might at least fit the mutual funds "arguably"
within the requisite "zone," although some courts might find the
relationship between the plaintiffs' interests and those of the statute
somewhat tenuous. If the opinion in Data Processing is read to
instruct courts to err on the side of granting standing when an
"arguable" claim is asserted, the plaintiffs would be more likely to
have standing under this analysis and formulation of the test.
If the Data Processing test were interpreted to mean that the
interests asserted by the plaintiffs must be within those protected
by statute, but do not have to be those personal to the plaintiffs,141
a more straightforward analysis would be possible. The interests
furthered by the Glass-Steagall Act can most accurately be characterized as "public" interests: the protection of the solvency of banks by
prohibiting risky investments and underwriting arrangements, and
ultimately and primarily, the protection of the public from the
economic disasters and depressions that are caused or aggravated by
bank failures. The mutual funds could assert that they are essentially
furthering that public interest by challenging the illegality of the
Comptroller's action. Such an interpretation of the Data Processing
test would recognize that regulatory legislation usually is intended
to protect public interests rather than private interests, and
that the considerations of public interests are more appropriately examined when determining the standing of the plaintiff. It is
true that special legislation sometimes carves out protection for
special interest groups, but the legislative history of such statutes
usually indicates clearly that the protection of the special interests
is the primary purpose of the legislation. When public interests are
the primary concern of Congress, however, the two previous formulations of the Data Processing test would dictate either a strained
attempt to find that the plaintiffs are intended beneficiaries of the
statute or a finding of no standing, which may effectively block
judicial review of important legal controversies.
Under the approach advocated by Justices Brennan and White,142
a court would decide the issue of standing solely by determining
141. See text preceding note 72 supra.
142. See pt. IV supra,
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whether or not the plaintiff had suffered injury in fact. There
appears little doubt that such injury could be proven by the plaintiffs in NASD. Under the Brennan approach, the court, having thus
held that the plaintiffs had standing, would then determine whether
or not the issue they raised was reviewable. Justice Brennan argued
that in order to establish reviewability, a plaintiff need demonstrate
only some "slight indicia" that he is a member of the class protected.143 As the foregoing analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act irtdicates, it is possible that mutual-fund representatives may not be able
to meet even this minimal requirement for reviewability. Justice
Brennan explicitly foresaw that in some circumstances the plaintiff
might not fit within his "class protected" test. In those instances,
he would take into account "public policy considerations" 144 to
determine reviewability. He noted that especially when the plaintiff
is the only party likely to challenge the administrative action, a court
should be very generous in defining the scope of congressional protection in order to avoid frustration of statutory objectives.145 Judges
Bazelon and Burger clearly indicated their belief that the plaintiffs
in N ASD were members of the limited class likely to challenge the
action of the Comptroller.146 Accordingly, the strong presumption in
favor of reviewability accorded by Justice Brennan's approach and by
the APA would no doubt be sufficient to provide for a grant of standing to the plaintiffs in that case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It must be conceded that any analysis of the various formulations
of the new standing test found in Data Processing and Barlow is
highly speculative. An analysis such as that attempted in this
Comment must, of necessity, draw upon possible implications and
alternative interpretations that the Supreme Court quite possibly
did not intend to suggest. An opportunity now exists for the Court
to clarify the confusion produced by its somewhat inconsistent choice
of phraseology in Data Processing and Barlow. The Supreme Court
has agreed to review the opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in NASD.147 The opinion that
emerges from that case may go far toward clearly setting forth the
means with which the federal judiciary may fulfill its newfound
mandate to provide an effective forum for reviewing the activities
of the federal regulatory agencies.
143. 397 U.S. at 175. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
144. 397 U.S. at 173.
145. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
146. 420 F.2d at 100, 107-08.
147. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. 397 U.S. 986 (1970) (No. 835,
1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term).

